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1 Introduction
Disinflation episodes are stressful times for modern developed economies and are usually
perceived as one — not to say the dominant — cause of recessions. For instance, Ball
(1994) argues that each of the downturns that affected the US economy in the early 1970s,
mid 1970s and early 1980s coincided with falling inflation caused by monetary tightening.
Likewise, many observers hold the Volcker disinflation responsible for the most severe
contraction in post World War II U.S. history. From a quantitative point of view, the
cumulative loss in output consecutive to a disinflation policy —also known as the sacrifice
ratio— is almost always found to be sizable.1 Disinflation recessions cannot be ignored
and are major events that any monetary model should account for. This paper addresses
this issue.
A whole strand of the literature, relying on a sticky price–sticky wage version of the
new Keynesian model, have attempted to account for the effects of disinflation policies on
aggregate dynamics. For instance, Ball (1995) proposes a model of a disinflation policy and
shows that it can deliver qualitatively satisfactory results. More recently Erceg and Levin
(2003) and Bordo, Erceg, Levin and Michaels (2006) show that a calibrated version of a
new Keynesian model can provide a good representation of disinflation episodes. Common
to all these papers is their departure from the standard model by assuming imperfect
information in the private sector. For instance, a key element of the last two papers is
that agents are imperfectly informed about the stance of monetary policy. This assumption
is critical for the result. Indeed in a full information version of the model, although prices
(and plausibly wages) are sticky, inflation remains so volatile that monetary policy can
drive the inflation rate down to zero without creating any loss in output. Hence, absent
imperfect information on the monetary policy stance, the model of the new Keynesian
Phillips curve creates a “Disinflation without Recession” (see Phelps (1978)), which is at
odds with the evidence. To borrow Gregory Mankiw’s provocative assertion in his Harry
Johnson Lecture at the 2000 meeting of the Royal Economic Society “although the new
Keynesian Phillips curve has many virtues, it also has one striking vice: It is completely
at odds with the facts.”
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. On the empirical side, we document
1For example, Ball (1994) reports sacrifice ratios of, respectively, 2.94% and 1.83% for the 1969:4–
1971:4 and the 1980:1–1983:4 disinflations. Erceg and Levin (2003), resorting to similar techniques as in
Ball (1994), report a sacrifice ratio of 1.7%. Cecchetti (1994) and Cecchetti and Rich (2001) find estimates
ranging from 1.3% to almost 10% using Vector AutoRegression techniques. Recent studies (see Filardo
(1998), Owyang and Ramey (2004), Francis and Owyang (2005)) have put the emphasis on potential
non–linearities in the sacrifice ratio, but still find that disinflation policies are associated with cumulative
output losses greater than 1%.
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the dynamic effects of disinflation policies on the main US aggregate variables. On the
theoretical side, we show that the inability of a full information version of the standard
new Keynesian model to account for disinflations stems from the modeling of the real
side of the model. Once the real side properly refined, the full information version of the
standard model is found to generate an empirically plausible recession in the aftermaths
of a disinflation policy.
In order to isolate the specific features of disinflation episodes, we first present an empirical
analysis of anti–inflationary policies in the post–World War II US economy. We do so by
resorting to episode techniques advocated by Romer and Romer (1989) and Romer and
Romer (1994) and more recently applied to fiscal policy shocks by Edelberg, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (1999), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2005). A disinflation episode is defined as an attempt from the Federal Reserve to create
a recession in order to reduce inflation. An advantage of this approach is that the response
of aggregate variables to a disinflation shock can be recovered without the need to specify
a particular monetary policy rule. We estimate a Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model
with episodes for the post–World War II US economy. The dynamic effects of a disinflation
policy is simply obtained as the responses of aggregates to these episodes.2 We find that
a disinflation policy immediately throws the economy into a persistent recession which
reaches its trough after 16 quarters. The inflation rate increases very little on impact but
keeps increasing during 4 quarters and eventually converges to a lower level in the long–
run. Inflation therefore displays a hump–shaped pattern that indicates that disinflation
policy are, paradoxically, accompanied by an increase in the inflation rate in the short–
run. In other words, successful disinflation policies require that the central bank tolerate
loose inflation targeting in the short–run.3 The behavior of the nominal interest rate is
consistent with the common view about disinflation policies. It exhibits a positive hump–
shaped pattern in the short–run corresponding to a tighter monetary policy as witnessed
by the drop in money growth. To complement our study, we conduct some robustness
analysis. In particular we investigate the important issue of identification of disinflation
episodes. Our experiments show that as soon as we move away from the selected episodes,
the dynamic responses of aggregate variables to shocks to the perturbed episodes are
dramatically affected by a change in the date of episodes. Second, we investigate the
robustness of the preceding patterns to changes in the specification of the VAR model —
2The dummy variables that capture episodes are found not to be Granger–caused by past values of the
variables included in the VAR. In other words, these dummies can be interpreted as exogenous shocks,
which legitimates our exercise.
3Such a behavior resembles the so–called price puzzle identified in the face of transitory monetary policy
shocks (see Sims (1992) and Eichenbaum (1992)). We however show that this behavior of inflation is robust
to various specifications of the VAR model which are known to eliminate the price puzzle in the context
of stationary monetary policy shocks.
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by relaxing long–run restrictions, and adding or altering some variables — or changes in
the identification procedure used to reveal disinflation shocks. Our results indicate that
the previous patterns are indeed robust.
In a second step we attempt to tackle explicitly the challenging problem of accounting for
the effects of a disinflation with a theoretical model. We propose a fully fledged DSGE
model of the new Keynesian Phillips curve and assess its ability to account for the dynamic
responses we obtained in the empirical analysis. The model that we construct has two key
features. First, it embeds most of the main building blocks of new Keynesian models. In
particular, it features sticky prices (wages), habit formation, adjustment costs, working
capital and variable capital utilization. Second the real side of the model slightly departs
from the benchmark new Keynesian model (Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005) or Smets
and Wouters (2005)) in one critical way. We follow Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2006) and assume that preferences feature deep habits. In other words, habit persistence
bears on each good the household consumes rather than on the consumption bundle as
a whole. This last assumption turns out to be critical as it is at the source of the main
mechanism driving our results: countercyclical markups. This aspect of the model has
already been put forward by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) as a key feature to account
for aggregate dynamics. We then implement a disinflation policy in the model in the
form of a permanent change in the inflation target of the central bank. The model is then
shown to be consistent with the dynamics reported in the empirical part of the paper. The
disinflation policy immediately creates a recession in the economy, the inflation rate and
the nominal interest rate both exhibit a positive hump–shaped response in the short–run
and eventually converge to their new –lower– steady state level. A version of the model
with standard habits fails to account for the facts. The same failure obtains when we
consider a version of the model that also features sticky wages, with or without working
capital. Therefore, as aforementioned, the deep habit hypothesis is key for the result. The
reason is as follows. As explained by Ravn et al. (2006), the price elasticity of demand is an
increasing function of aggregate demand in the deep habit model. Therefore, by creating
a recession, the disinflation policy yields a decrease in the price elasticity of demand,
translating into higher markups, which then turn out to be countercyclical. Therefore
prices can increase in the short–run. This triggers a tighter monetary policy that pushes
interest rate upward and magnifies the recession. Absent this mechanism the model fails to
account for the facts. Our results are found to be robust against alternative specifications
of the monetary policy rule used to achieve the disinflation policy. We conclude that, as
argued by Christiano et al. (2005), any model that aims at accounting for monetary facts
has to possess strong enough real propagation mechanisms that can protract the effects of
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monetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our identification strategy of dis-
inflation policy shocks, discusses our specification choices and the selected dates of the
disinflation episodes. It then reports and details our empirical findings. Section 3 assesses
the robustness of our empirical findings to changes in the dates of episodes, the specifica-
tion of the VAR, and the identification strategy. Section 4 presents our theoretical model
putting emphasis on the deep habit assumption. Section 5 presents and discusses our
theoretical results, highlighting the role played by each assumption for our quantitative
findings. A last section offers some concluding remarks.
2 Empirical Evidence of a Disinflation Shock with Monetary
Policy Episodes
This section first presents our identification strategy of disinflation policy shocks which
basically hinges on the episode technique advocated by Romer and Romer (1989). We
then discuss our specification choices and the selected dates of the disinflation episodes.
2.1 Identifying the Effects of a Disinflation Policy Shock
The identification of monetary policy shocks is largely debated in the literature. Romer
and Romer (1989) and Romer and Romer (1994) have proposed to use a narrative approach
to isolate episodes in which large exogenous monetary disturbances are observed. Each
isolated episode corresponds to an attempt from the Federal Reserve to create a recession
in order to reduce inflation. These episodes therefore correspond to disinflation policy
shocks and can be used to uncover the effects of such shocks on macroeconomic dynamics.
This is the approach we pursue in this paper. As noticed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1999), an advantage of Romer and Romer’s approach is that the econometrician
does not have to formally specify a monetary feedback rule nor to impose a particular
identification scheme to recover the responses of the economy. A second advantage of this
approach is that the selected episodes correspond to the Fed’s intentions to implement an
anti–inflationary policy, therefore giving us the opportunity to identify the effects of these
specific policies. However, as argued by Shapiro (1994), one of its potential weakness is
that the selected dates can reflect aspects of monetary policy that are largely forecastable
using macroeconomic variables. An additional weakness of the approach is that only a
handful of episodes is available to identify the aggregate effects of a disinflation policy.
The first issue will be addressed by means of Granger causality tests. In order to address
The Dynamic Effects of Disinflation Policies 6
the second issue, we add four additional dates to Romer and Romer’s episodes within our
sample and pool (once properly scaled) all these episodes into a single dummy variable in
an attempt to specify a parsimonious econometric framework.
We use the following procedure.4 Let the vector Zt include monetary policy variables as
well as other aggregates (output, consumption, inflation rate,. . . ) and define the dummy
variables Di,t, i = 1, 2, . . . , n where n is the number of selected episodes. Di,t satisfies
Di,t =
{
1, if t = di
0, otherwise
di denotes the i–th element of d = (t1, t2, ..., tn)
′ where ti (i = 1, ..., n) denotes the date of
episode i. Zt is assumed to follow a stochastic process of the form
Zt = A0 +
p∑
j=1
A1,jZt−j +
q∑
j=0
A2,jD˜t−j + ut (1)
where
D˜t =
n∑
i=1
ψiDi,t (2)
and
E(ut) = 0 ; E(utu′t−s) =

0,∀s 6= 0
Σ, for s = 0
The scalars p and q in equation (1) are finite integers that determine the number of lags for
Z and D, respectively. The ψi’s in equation (2) are positive weights with the normalization∑n
i=1 ψi = 1. It should then be clear that ψi is a measure of the relative intensity of episode
i and that D˜t is a weighted dummy variable that sums up the information contained in
the selected episodes. In the sequel, D˜t will be referred to as the episodes variable. An
advantage of this approach is its parsimony. Furthermore, it facilitates the interpretation
of the results as it amounts to assuming that the dynamic effects of all the episodes are
identical, while they are free to differ in their intensity. From the estimation of (1), the
response of the j–th element of Z at time t+ h (h > 0) to a disinflation shock in period t
is obtained from the coefficient on Lh in the moving average representationI − p∑
j=1
A2,jL
j
−1 q∑
j=0
A2,jL
j (3)
where L is the backshift operator.
4See Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al. (2004), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) in the case of
government spending and fiscal shocks.
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2.2 Data and Episodes
Model (1) is estimated using US quarterly data. The sample runs from 1960:1 to 2002:4.
As argued in Burnside et al. (2004) the choice of variables in Zt implies a trade–off. On
the one hand, we would like to include as many variables as possible. However, this would
imply estimating a very large number of parameters in a finite sample, thus yielding
very imprecise estimates of the responses to a disinflation shock. On the other hand, a
regression featuring too few variables in Zt could be corrupted by an omitted variable
bias. We therefore choose to adopt an intermediate empirical strategy. In our benchmark
experiment, Zt includes the following 9 variables: the cyclical component of real output
(ŷt), the log of the consumption–output ratio (ct − yt), the log of the investment–output
ratio (xt − yt), the inflation rate (pit), the nominal interest rate (it), wage inflation (piwt ),
a measure of profits (Proft), money growth (γM2,t) and a wage wedge (wwt). The cyclical
component of output is obtained as the residual of a regression of the log of real GDP on
a constant and a linear trend.5 The consumption–output ratio is measured as the ratio
of nominal consumption expenditures (including nondurables, services and government
expenditures) to nominal GDP. The investment–output ratio is defined as the ratio of
nominal expenditures on consumer durables and private investment to nominal GDP. We
measure inflation using the growth rate of the GDP deflator, obtained as the ratio of
nominal output to real GDP. Wage inflation is measured as the growth rate of hourly
compensation in the Non Farm Business (NFB) sector. The nominal interest rate is the
Federal fund rate. The rate of profits is defined as the ratio of after tax corporate profits
to nominal GDP. Money growth is the growth rate of M2. The wage wedge is defined as
the difference between the logs of labor productivity (GDP divided by hours worked in
the NFB sector) and the logs of the real wage (hourly compensation in the NFB sector
over the GDP deflator). The data are reported in Figure 1. To identify the effects of a
permanent disinflation shock, we adopt the following specification for Zt:
Zt =
(
ŷt, ct − yt, xt − yt, ∆pit, it − pit, piwt − pit, Proft, γM2,t − pit, wwt
)′ (4)
Inflation is specified in first differences to a priori allow for a permanent effect of a disin-
flation policy. Notice that we do not impose any restriction about the sign of the long–run
response of inflation. In addition, we impose that the long–run responses of the nominal
variables are the same. To investigate the empirical plausibility of this long–run restric-
tion, we test the null hypothesis of a unit root for it − pit, piwt − pit and γM2,t − pit using
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. The first difference of each variable is regressed
on a constant, the lagged level as well as four lags of the first difference. The ADF test
5Note that our results are left unaffected if we use alternative definitions of this component.
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statistic is equal to -4.32 for the ex–post real interest rate (it−pit), -12.17 for the difference
between wage inflation and inflation (piwt −pit) and -5.32 for the difference between money
growth and inflation (γM2,t−pit). The unit root hypothesis is thus rejected at the 1 percent
level for each variable.6
For the sample period we consider, the Romer and Romer (1989) episodes are: December
1968; April 1974; August 1978; October 1979. We follow Christiano et al. (1999) by
adding the 1966 credit crunch of February 1966 (see Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993))
and the August 1988 episode identified by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) as the beginning
of a monetary contraction.7 In addition, we include the end of 1993 and the first quarter
of 2000 in our index of monetary contractions. Monetary policy was indeed characterized
by noticeable intended increases in the Federal fund rate target in response to inflation
pressures at these last two dates. In December 1993, FOMC members considered that
a policy change would appropriately signal the Committee’s concern about inflation. To
reflect this intended policy change, we choose to add 1993:4 as an episode, despite that
inflationary pressure effectively appeared in the middle of 1994.8 At the February 2000
meeting, the FOMC considered that there was little evidence that demand was coming into
line with potential supply, and thus the risks of inflationary imbalances appeared to have
risen. The FOMC therefore raised its target for the Federal funds rate and emphasized
the risks of remaining on higher inflation pressures. To sum up, we select the following
eight episodes
d = (1966:2, 1968:4, 1974:2, 1978:3, 1979:4, 1988:3, 1993:4, 2000:1)′
The weights ψi are obtained by computing the peak changes in the Federal fund rate
following each episode date. These weights are:
ψ = (0.045, 0.267, 0.055, 0.189, 0.095, 0.145, 0.208, 0.057)
Out of the eight selected episodes, four of them represent 80% of the total weight: 1968:4,
1978:4, 1988:3 and 1993:4. Note that the contribution of episode 1968:4 is rather large,
since it represents more than 25% of the weights. These four episodes are of particular
interest for our identification strategy because each of them clearly reveals the monetary
authorities’ intention of taming inflation. As noticed by Romer and Romer (1989), the
Federal Reserve decided in 1968:4 to engineer a disinflation despite declines in present
and expected growth. A similar policy was conducted in August 1978, when a tight
6 The critical values of the ADF test statistic at 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels are -3.49, -2.88
and -2.57, respectively.
7Romer and Romer (1994) added an episode date around this time in their extended sample.
8In Section 3.1, we consider the issue of uncertainty about the dates of episodes and we show that our
results are left unaffected by a one quarter (lead and lag) change in the selected time.
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monetary policy was maintained despite forecasts of sluggish growth. Likewise, the 1988:3
episode reveals similar concerns of monetary authorities. As reported in Romer and Romer
(1994), the discussions about short–term monetary policy at FOMC meetings made ex-
plicit reference to “the desirability of making clear that the current rate of inflation was
unacceptable”9 and to a monetary policy tightening as a way “to permit progress to be made
in reducing inflation over time”. Finally, for the last of these four episodes, the FOMC
agreed on the necessity of a prompt tightening move in monetary policy “to provide greater
assurance that inflationary pressures in the economy would remain subdued”.
Figure 1: Data and Episodes
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Note: The dashed line correspond to the dates of disinflation episodes. All variables are in logs.
The dates of our episodes are reported in Figure 1 together with actual data. The figure
shows that output sharply decreases after each of these dates. This is especially true
after the 1968:4, 1979:4, 1988:3 and 2000:1 episodes. Conversely, the output drop appears
9All quotations are reported in the “Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee”, Federal Reserve
Bulletin, various issues.
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somewhat moderate after the 1966:2 and 1993:4 episodes. The consumption–output ratio
moves in the opposite direction, reflecting the smoothness of consumption. In contrast,
the investment–output ratio falls significantly after each episode, with the exception of
1993:4. Inflation decreases in the periods subsequent to the episode dates whereas the
Federal fund rate sharply increases after the 1968:4, 1978:3 and 1993:4 episodes. Wage
inflation behaves as the rate of inflation, but with a moderate decrease. Interestingly,
profits sharply decrease after the credit crunch episode of 1966:2 and the 1978:3–1979:4
episodes. Money growth has an overall pattern similar to those of inflation and wage
inflation, i.e. it decreases after the disinflation episodes. Finally, the wage wedge evolves
in a way similar to profits and decreases after the 1966:2, 1978:3 and 1979:4 episodes.
2.3 Empirical Findings
Given our choice for Zt in (4), we first estimate (1) for the sample period 1960:1 to 2002:4.
The scalars p and q in (1) are both set to 4 according to standard criteria. As a first step, we
assess the contribution of the episode variables D˜t, ..., D˜t−4 in terms of fit. The likelihood
ratio test leads us to reject the null hypothesis that A2,0 = A2,1 = · · · = A2,4 = 0 in model
(1) since the associated statistic is equal to 75.46 with a corresponding p–value of 0.3%.
Before proceeding any further, it is important to make sure that the episodes variable
is not Granger–caused by aggregate variables in Zt. Indeed, one important and common
criticism addressed to the narrative approach is the predictability of D˜t (see Shapiro (1994)
and Leeper (1997)) which then questions the exogenous status of D˜t in model (1). We
therefore follow Leeper (1997) and run Granger causality tests for D˜t using both OLS
and logistic regressions. The regression includes four lags of all the variables contained
in Zt. Both tests reject that past values of Zt help predicting disinflation episodes.10 We
are therefore immune to the critique put forth by Shapiro (1994) and Leeper (1997). As
a second step, the responses of the aggregate variables are computed using equation (3).
They are reported in Figure 2. The figure also reports the centered 95 percent confidence
interval as computed by standard bootstrap methods, using 1000 draws from the sample
residuals. The size of the disinflation shock is normalized such that the inflation rate is
1 point below its initial level in the long–run. Since we impose a long–run restriction
on nominal variables, the nominal interest rate, wage inflation, and money growth also
converge to the same lower value in the long–run.
The response of output is persistently negative and displays a U–shaped profile that attains
10In the OLS regression, the Fisher test statistic is 1.02 with a P–value of 45.53% and the Wald test
takes a value of 47.02 with P–value of 10.34%. The corresponding values for the logistic regression are
respectively given by 0.87 (P–value=67.80%) and 40.25 (P–value=28.76%).
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its trough after 16 quarters. Notice that the response is still negative five years after the
onset of a disinflation episode. In addition, the negative response of output appears
precisely estimated. Consumption and investment display a similar persistent pattern.
However, the size of the response differs. Consumption is less responsive than output
whereas investment drops sharply. A noticeable finding relates to the response of inflation.
Recall that the long–run response of inflation is negative. However, inflation exhibits a
positive hump–shaped response in the short–run which reaches its peak 1 year after the
disinflation shock. It is also worth noting that the peak in the response of inflation (+1%)
is about the same size as the overall disinflation (-1%). In other words, the disinflation
policy is followed by a sizeable increase in inflation. Moreover, this increase is long–lasting
as it takes 4 years for the response of inflation to become negative. Interestingly, the
nominal interest rate displays a similar pattern. The response is positive and hump–
shaped, peaking after about 6 periods. The hump pattern of the nominal interest rate
is significantly different from zero, as suggested by the narrow confidence interval at the
peak value. Notice that the short–run positive response is twice as large as the long–run
response. In other words, a disinflation policy which permanently leads to a decline of 4%
per year in the inflation rate in the long–run implies an increase in the nominal interest
rate by an amount of 8% per year in the short–run. The nominal interest rate thus appears
very reactive in the short–run after our identified disinflation shock. The response of wage
inflation is similar to that of inflation except in the very short–run where the response is
negative and small. The disinflation shock also leads to a persistent decline in profits and
in the wage wedge. Finally, the response of money growth is in line with intuition as it
essentially mirrors that of the nominal interest rate in the short–run. However, money
growth follows the inflation rate in the subsequent periods and permanently falls in the
long–run. In the sequel, we essentially focus our analysis on the response of those variables
that lie at the core of the monetary propagation mechanism: output, inflation, and the
nominal interest rate. These variables will be later used as a discriminating device between
competing theories of disinflation.
In order to supplement the preceding analysis, we now investigate an alternative way
of assessing the historical impact of a disinflation policy on aggregate variables. For
each episode, we generate forecasts of Zt using the estimated model. We then run a
counterfactual experiment in which we shut down the episode variable. The last exercise
then accounts for the dynamics that would have prevailed absent of disinflation shock.
Figure 3 reports these forecasts for output, inflation and the nominal interest rate. In
each figure, the gray plain line represents actual data, the dark plain line corresponds
to the forecast with episode dummies and the dark dashed line is the forecast without
the latter. These forecasts are computed for the next twelve quarters following the date
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Figure 2: Response to disinflation episodes
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of the episode. Recall that our normalization of ψi’s implies that the effects of different
episodes only differ in their size. Figure 3 does not report the historical decomposition for
all the episodes, since the out–of–sample forecasts with dummies only slightly outperform
those obtained without dummies for the episodes 1966:1, 1974:2, 1979:4 and 2001:1.11.
Panels (a)–(d) of Figure 3 display forecasts for the episodes 1968:4, 1978:3, 1988:3 and
1993:4, which are also those which are assigned the highest weight in ψ. For all these
episodes, the introduction of D˜t improves on the forecasts of output and nominal interest
rate. Notably, the inclusion of episodes allows for a better fit of (i) the initial increase in
the nominal interest rate following each episode and (ii) the decrease in output after the
episodes 1968:4, 1978:3 and 1988:3.
3 Robustness Analysis
The previous section documented the response of the US economy to a disinflation policy.
We now check the robustness of our empirical findings to various modifications. These
relate to the dates of episodes, the specification of Zt, and the identification strategy.
3.1 Robustness to the Episodes Dates
As aforementioned, out of the eight selected episodes, four of them represent 80% of
the total weight: 1968:4, 1978:4, 1988:3 and 1993:4. As a first attempt to check for
the robustness of our results, we investigate how the omission of the other four episodes
(1966:2, 1974:2, 1978:3 and 2000:1) ought to induce some specification bias. Figure 4
reports the associated IRFs. As can be seen from the figure, the main conclusions of the
analysis remain. In the aftermath of the announcement of the disinflation, the economy
enters a persistent and profound recession that hits its trough after about 4 years. Inflation
first persistently rises to eventually reach its new level. The nominal interest rate displays
a similar hump–shaped pattern.
We then investigate the role played by the uncertainty surrounding the actual dates at
which disinflation policy shocks occurred in the same model. A simple way to assess
the importance of an episode date is to re–estimate the model with different disinflation
episodes dates and inspect whether the shape of the response is altered by such a change.
Uncertainty about the dates of the episodes does not matter if the response of the economy
is only marginally affected by a small perturbation in the selected dates. At the same time,
if the response of the economy remains unaltered whichever dates are considered, there
11These forecasts are reported in Figure 17 in Appendix
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Figure 3: Historical decomposition of episodes
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Figure 4: Omitting the unimportant episodes
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should be no compelling reasons to interpret these estimated responses as the aggregate
outcomes of a disinflation policy, as argued by Edelberg et al. (1999) in the context of
large fiscal shocks. Accordingly, to assess the robustness of our finding to the selected
date, we perform the following three experiments:
• Experiment I: We lead and lag by one quarter all the dates.
• Experiment II: Same as experiment I, but with four lags and leads in all the dates.
The results associated to each experiment for output, inflation, and the nominal interest
rate are reported in Figures 5 and 6. Let us first consider the case of a small perturbation
(a one quarter lead or lag) in the selected date. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 5 show
that such a small perturbation in the date does not modify our previous findings: output
persistently decreases, the response of inflation is positive and becomes negative after
about 4 quarters, and the nominal interest rate displays a sizeable and positive hump
profile in the short–run. The results are very different if we modify the episode dates in a
more important way. Figure 6 reports the responses for a four–quarter lag or lead in all
the episodes dates (Experiment II). Panel (a) of Figure 6 displays the response when the
episodes dates are lagged by four quarters. In this case, the response of output becomes
persistently positive and we get positive responses of inflation and the nominal interest
rate. The identified shock is broadly similar to a positive demand shock which increases
output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate. Panel (b) of Figure 6 displays the response
when the dates are shifted by a four–quarter lead. Now, both output and inflation respond
negatively to the identified shock. This shock can be interpreted as a negative demand
shock that simultaneously shifts quantities and prices.
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Figure 5: Robustness to episodes (Experiment I)
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Figure 6: Robustness to episodes (Experiment II)
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3.2 Robustness to the VAR Specification
An additional way to check the robustness of our results is to investigate the sensitivity
of the estimated response to alternative specifications of Zt. We go back to the model
with our eight episodes and examine the role played by the long–run relationship imposed
on nominal variables, the addition of new variables, as well as alternative definitions of
inflation.
Let us first consider the consequences of our assumed long–run restrictions. Indeed, our
specification of Zt in equation (4) imposes that the nominal variables —inflation, wage
inflation, the nominal interest rate, and money growth— reach the same level in the long–
run. We now investigate the role played by this restriction on the short–run dynamics of
output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate. In this experiment, the vector Zt does
not impose this restriction and accordingly rewrites:
Zt =
(
ŷt, ct − yt, xt − yt, ∆pit, it, piwt , Proft, γM2,t, wwt
)′
With this new vector Zt, we re–estimate the model using the identification strategy of
Section 2.1. Panel (a) of Figure 7 reports the estimated responses of output, inflation,
and the nominal interest rate. The comparison of Figures 2 and 7 shows that relaxing
the long–run restrictions imposed on nominal variables is of no substantial consequence
on our previous findings.
We now investigate the effect of the addition of new variables in Zt. We first inspect
the consequences of introducing the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) price index of
raw materials (see Leeper and Roush (2003)). Indeed, our results suggest a short–run
and persistent increase in prices which seems reminiscent of the so–called price puzzle
often arising in monetary SVAR models (see Christiano et al. (1999) for a survey) in the
face of stationary shocks. Indeed, on several occasions in our sample, a rise in inflation
has followed a rise in the Federal funds rate and in commodity prices. Thus, omitting a
commodity price from Zt could potentially lead to the apparently paradoxical result that
an intended monetary tightening leads to an increase in inflation. Adding the CRB price
index of raw materials has however little effect on our conclusions, as can be seen in panel
(b) of Figure 7. Indeed, while this commodity price is sufficient to mitigate the price puzzle
arising in a monetary SVAR model perturbed by stationary monetary policy shocks, it
does not alter the inflation profile obtained in our empirical results. This suggests that
these inflation dynamics are a key feature of a disinflation policy.
Similarly, some of the monetary episodes we consider are almost contemporaneous to oil
price shocks. Thus, one may wonder whether the persistent decline in output following the
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identified disinflation policy might rather reflect the impact of a large increase in oil prices
at the end of the seventies.12 To control for this possibility, we consider two alternative
measures of oil shocks. First, we simply settle for adding in Zt the growth rate of the
West Texas Intermediate Crude Spot Price and we re–estimate the model. As shown in
Panel (c) of Figure 7 the shape of the responses are left unaffected by this modification
of Zt. Second, we build a second set of dummies corresponding to the oil shocks episodes
considered by Hamilton (2003). These episodes are meant to capture large exogenous
disruptions in the world petroleum supply. Within our sample, the dates are: 1973:4,
1978:4, 1980:4, and 1990:3. These dummies are scaled according to the drop in world
production, as reported by Hamilton (2003). Panel (d) of Figure 7 reports the responses
when controlling for these dates. As is clear, including these large oil shocks has little
effect on our results. In particular, inflation dynamics are virtually unchanged.
In our evaluation of disinflation policies, we used the growth rate of the GDP deflator
as a measure of inflation. However, central banks often focus on alternative measures
of inflation, such as the growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI). We now check
the robustness of our results to such alternative measures of inflation. Panels (e) and
(f) of Figure 7 report the responses when the CPI price index including or excluding
food and energy expenditures is used instead of the GDP deflator. In these two cases, the
negative response of output and the short–run positive hump-shaped profile of the nominal
interest rate are maintained. The short–run response of inflation is a slightly affected
since the positive and persistent profile appears somewhat less pronounced. Finally, we
investigate the sensitivity of our findings to another measure of the short–run nominal
interest rate. We now use the three–month Treasury Bill rate on the secondary market
instead of the Federal fund rate. The responses are reported in Panel (g) of Figure 7. The
comparison with Figure 2 shows that our benchmark results are unaffected by considering
this alternative measure of the nominal interest rate.
3.3 An Alternative Identification Strategy
Our evaluation of disinflation policy is conducted using normalized episodes of hypothetical
disinflation policies. A simple way to evaluate the robustness of our findings is to compare
the estimated responses using scaled dummies to what one would obtain from alternative
identification strategies. The long–run identification restriction a` la Blanchard and Quah
12Hoover and Perez (1994) argue that it is not possible to distinguish monetary shocks as identified with
the narrative approach from an oil shock as a cause of a recession. This is especially true when variables are
taken in isolation and when the effects of monetary policy are obtained from single equation restrictions.
Our approach combines a large set of variables from which it is possible to properly identify the effects of
monetary policy.
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Figure 7: Robustness to Specification
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(1989) offers another attractive way to assess the effects of a permanent disinflation policy.
This identification strategy departs from that with scaled dummies in that it generates an
episode for all the sample points.13 We now assume that the stochastic process for Zt is
of the form
Zt = B0 +
p∑
j=1
B1,jZt−j + vt
where
E(vt) = 0 ; E(vtv′t−s) =

0,∀s 6= 0
Ω, fors = 0
The specification of Zt is the same as in equation (4). In particular we assume the same
long–run restrictions among nominal variables. In addition, in the spirit of Blanchard and
Quah (1989), we use the identifying restriction that only disinflation shocks can have a
long–run effect on inflation in Zt.14 Using this restriction, we can generate the responses
of the components of Zt to this policy shock. The results are reported in Figure 8. The
Figure 8: Response to disinflation episodes (Blanchard and Quah identification)
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responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate are similar to those obtained
using selected episodes both in sign and persistence.15 The main difference is found in
the very short–run responses of output and other real variables, since they display a small
positive —although not significant— response to the permanent disinflation shock. In
contrast, the responses of inflation and the nominal interest rate are virtually the same.
It is worth noting that the response of output is closely related to that obtained in our
previous identification strategy when the episode variable is lagged by one quarter (see
Panel (a) of Figure 5). This suggests that our selected episodes are leading the policy
13Cecchetti and Rich (2001) use long–run restrictions on output to assess the sacrifice ratio. However,
in our framework, these restrictions are imposed on nominal variables rather than on real variables.
14These results are similar if we use other nominal variables (nominal interest rate, wage inflation and
money growth) for the identification of the policy shock with long–run restrictions.
15Note that the size of the shocks is different as in this decomposition, shocks occur in each and every
period and are therefore way smaller. The responses of all variables in Zt are reported in Figure 18 in
Appendix.
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shocks as identified with long–run restrictions. This finding is confirmed by Granger
causality tests. Using two or four lags for the scaled dummies associated to our eight
selected episodes, the exclusion test leads us to reject the null hypothesis that the dates
of disinflation policy episodes do not Granger–cause the disinflation shocks. This finding
echoes previous statements by Romer and Romer (1989), since episodes isolated with their
narrative approach may represent intentions rather than actions of the Federal Reserve.16
Finally, one can always argue that the so identified disinflation shock may actually reveal
negative technology shocks and that estimated responses ought to be highly contaminated
by this type of shocks.17 However, two elements mainly differentiate our estimated disin-
flation shock from a standard technology shock. First of all, the estimated responses with a
dummy variable and a SVAR model with a long–run restriction deliver the same long–run
effect of disinflation policy: this policy reduces inflation and the Fed fund permanently in
the long–run. On the contrary, when we identify a permanent technology shock using the
long–run restriction strategy used by Blanchard and Quah (1989) or Gal´ı (1999), we find
that the response of inflation to a negative technology shock remains always positive at
all horizons. In addition, the response of inflation is twice as large as that obtained with
our identified monetary policy shock.
4 A Model of Disinflation
The model is a standard new Keynesian model. The economy is populated by a large
number of identical infinitely–lived households and firms. Each firm produces a single
good which can be used for consumption and investment purposes. The firm has monopoly
power over for the good it produces. Each good is produced with capital and labor.
The production of the final good also requires intermediate material goods. The model
features all standard real frictions that are commonly introduced in the literature (habit
persistence, adjustment costs, utilization). We only depart from the standard model in
that we follow Ravn et al. (2006) and assume that habit persistence affects each good
individually rather than the consumption bundle as a whole. This plays a key role for
the results. Our benchmark model features both deep habits and price stickiness. For
comparison purposes we will also consider a version of the standard habit model with
price stickiness and a version that will also feature sticky wages.18
16Note that the reverse is not true. Causality from the policy shocks identified in the SVAR to the
episodes variable is strongly rejected by the data.
17Oil price shock is another good candidate (see Hoover and Perez (1994)), but we have already shown
that our results are robust to this variable.
18The interested reader is referred to Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) or Christiano et al. (2005) for
a formal description of nominal wage contracting problem.
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4.1 The Household
Household preferences are characterized by the lifetime utility function:
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[
log(st+τ ) +
νm
1− σm
(
Mt+τ
Pt+τ
)1−σm
− ν
h
1 + σh
h1+σht+τ
]
(5)
where 0 < β < 1 is a constant discount factor, M/P is real balances and h is hours
worked supplied by the representative household. The household also derives utility from
the consumption index st. We follow Ravn et al. (2006) and assume that st captures
the idea that preferences feature habit persistence on each good the household consumes
rather than on the consumption bundle as a whole. Following these authors we refer to
this phenomenon as “deep habits”. The consumption index, st, then takes the form
st =
(∫ 1
0
(ct(j)− bct−1(j))θdj
) 1
θ
(6)
Following Abel (1990), preferences feature “catching up with the Joneses” as the household
values the difference between her current consumption of good j, ct(j), and aggregate past
consumption of the same good, ct−1(j). Note however that, as in Ravn et al. (2006), this
catching up phenomenon takes place for each individual good. The parameter b measures
the degree of external habit formation in consumption and is common to all varieties. We
will also consider an alternative specification in which preferences feature habit formation
with regard to the consumption bundle as a whole rather than each consumption good.
In this case, st writes as st = ct − bct−1. This will be referred to as the “standard habit”
specification.
The budget constraint is standardly given by
BtQt +Mt +
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)(ct(j) + it(j) + vt(j))dj =Bt−1 +Mt−1 +Ωt
+ Ptrk,tutkt + Ptwtht +Πt (7)
where wt is the real wage; Pt is the nominal price of the domestic final good; ct(j) is
consumption of good j and it(j) is investment expenditure in variety j. These investment
goods are then combined according to the following CES aggregator
it =
(∫ 1
0
it(j)θdj
) 1
θ
(8)
to accumulate capital according to the law of motion
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it − ωΦi
(
it
it−1
)
it − (1− ω)Φk
(
it
kt
)
kt (9)
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where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant depreciation rate. ω is a binary parameter that enables
us to select among the two adjustment costs specifications we consider. Setting ω = 1 we
select a dynamic investment adjustment cost specification (see Christiano et al. (2005),
Christiano and Fisher (2003) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005)). In this environment,
it is the growth rate of investment which is penalized when varied in the neighborhood of
its steady state value. The function Φi(·) reflects the presence of investment adjustment
costs. We assume that Φi(·) satisfies (i) Φi(1) = Φ′i(1) = 0 and (ii) ϕi = Φ′′i (1) > 0. It
follows that the steady state of the model does not depend on the parameter ϕi while its
dynamic properties do. Setting ω = 0 we select a capital adjustment costs specification
a` la Lucas and Prescott (1971), as represented by the function Φk(·), that penalizes the
investment–to–capital ratio. We then assume that Φk(·) satisfies (i) Φk(δ) = 0, Φ′k(δ) = 1
and (ii) ϕk = δΦ′′k(δ) > 0. Just like investment adjustment costs, the steady state of
the model does not depend on the parameter ϕk while its dynamic properties do. The
dynamic specification for adjustment costs is a significant source of internal propagation
mechanisms as the impulse response analysis will show. kt is the amount of physical
capital owned by the household and rented to the firms at the real rate rk,t. Only a
fraction ut of the capital stock is utilized in any period. Utilization of the capital stock
triggers expenditures in the form of each good j such that
z(ut)kt =
(∫ 1
0
vt(j)θdj
) 1
θ
(10)
where z(·) is a strictly increasing convex function, which satisfies (i) z(1) = 0, z′(1) > 0
and (ii) σz = z′′(1)/z′(1) > 0. Mt−1 is the amount of money that the household brings into
period t, andMt is the end of period t money holdings. Ωt is a nominal lump–sum transfer
received from the monetary authority and Πt denotes profits the household receives from
the firms. Bt is the amount of nominal claims the household buys at price Qt to transfer
wealth across periods.
The household then determines her consumption, savings, money holdings and labor sup-
ply plans by maximizing (5) subject to (6)–(10). An interesting feature of this approach is
that the total demand of good j for consumption purpose features a dynamic component
ct(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) 1
θ−1
st + bct−1(j) (11)
Note that in the case of standard habit formation the demand function reduces to the
standard static form
ct(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) 1
θ−1
ct. (12)
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The other components of demand , dt(j) ∈ {it(j), vt(j)}, are standardly given by
dt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) 1
θ−1
dt (13)
4.2 Producers
Each good j is produced by means of capital and labor according to a constant returns–
to–scale technology, represented by the Cobb–Douglas production function
Yt(j) = min
{
A(ut(j)kt(j))αht(j)1−α −F
1− sx ,
xt(j)
sx
}
(14)
where α ∈ (0, 1). kt(j), ht(j) and xt(j) respectively denote the physical capital, utilized
at rate ut(j), the labor input used by firm j and a bundle of material goods used in the
production process. A is a positive constant that determines the total factor productivity
of the technology. F denotes the positive fixed cost of production. Material goods are
introduced in the model as a way to improve the ability of the model to generate inflation
inertia,19 as the real marginal cost is now given by
mct = (1− sx)
rαk,tw
1−α
t
Aαα(1− α)1−α + sx
The parameter sx ∈ (0, 1) is the weight placed on material goods in production. Each firm
j purchases a bundle of material goods of the form
xt(j) =
(∫ 1
0
xt(i, j)θdi
) 1
θ
which yields the demand function
xt(i, j) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
) 1
θ−1
xt(j)
Hence the total demand for the material good j addressed to the firm is given by
xdt (j) =
∫ 1
0
xt(j, i)di =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) 1
θ−1
xt
where xt is aggregate demand for material goods.
Each firm j operates under perfect competition in the inputs markets, but acts as a
monopolistic competitor on the good market. We assume that it is costly for the firm
to adjust prices, Pt(j), relative to the reference path determined by pitPt−i(j). We follow
19This assumption will help all the versions of the model we consider, including competing models.
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Christiano et al. (2005) and assume pit = pit−1. Adjusting the price level entails a quadratic
cost
ψt(j) =
ψ
2
(
Pt(j)− pitPt−1(j)
pitPt−1(j)
)2
yt
This cost is assumed to be proportional to value added, yt, and is measured in terms of
the basket of intermediate goods, such that
ψt(j) =
(∫ 1
0
ψt(i, j)θdi
) 1
θ
Note that, when inserted into a standard framework, this specification yields a similar
log–linear version of Phillips curve as that obtained in a Calvo setting. Hence, the price
adjustment cost parameter can simply be set so as to match the standard Phillips curve in a
standard setting.20 Production and price setting plans are then determined by maximizing
profits, as given by
∞∑
τ=0
ρt+τ
[
Pt+τ (j)(ct+τ (j) + dt+τ (j))− Pt+τwt+τht+τ (j)− Pt+τrk,t+τut+τ (j)kt+τ (j) . . .
− Pt+τ ψ2
(
Pt+τ (j)− pitPt+τ−1(j)
pit+τPt+τ−1(j)
)2
yt+τ
]
subject to the technological constraint (14), the non consumption demand it faces
dt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) 1
θ−1
dt
where dt(j) = it(j)+vt(j)+ψt(j)+xdt (j) (similarly for dt) and the demand for consumption
purposes (equation (11) in the case of deep habits, and equation (12) in the case of standard
habit formation).
4.3 The monetary authorities
Disinflation episodes are periods of monetary tightening. Such tightening can be achieved
in various ways. The central banker can decide to cut money growth, or to rise the nominal
interest rate. Hereafter, we will use a nominal interest rule of the form
log(Rt) = ρr log(Rt−1) + (1− ρr)
[
log(R) + ωy(log(yt)− log(y)) + ωpi(log(pit)− log(pi)
]
where Rt is the gross nominal rate of interest. y and pi represent, respectively, the level
of steady state output and inflation. A disinflation episode will then be modeled as a
permanent decrease in pi.
20This will be our calibration strategy.
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This modeling strategy is debatable. One may object that a nominal interest rate rule
was not explicitly used in the pre–Volcker period. However, as argued by Taylor (1999),
nominal interest rate rule are a useful and quite accurate tool to understand various
monetary episodes in the post World–War II period. Furthermore, we will assess the
robustness of our findings to alternative specifications of disinflation policy. In particular,
for comparative purposes, we will also use (i) an active money growth rule in which the
central banker has explicit concern about inflation and output gap, and (ii) a discretionary
control of money injections.
5 Results
This section discusses the ability of the model to account for disinflation episodes. We
first report and discuss the parametrization of the model. We then present our results and
discuss the role of (i) monetary policy and (ii) real frictions.
5.1 Calibration
The economy is calibrated on US data for the post World War II period. We borrow most
of our parameters from the literature dealing with new Keynesian models (as exemplified
by Christiano et al. (2005)). Our benchmark calibration is reported in Table 1.
The discount factor, β, is set such that households discount the future at a 3% annual rate,
yielding β = 0.9926. The parameter determining the inverse of the Frishian labor supply
elasticity, σh, and the markup that applies to wages in the wage contracts version of the
model are borrowed from Christiano et al. (2005). This led us to set σh = 1 and a 5%
markup rate over wages in a version of the model featuring nominal wage contracts. As
far as the habit parameter is concerned, we have to consider two alternative values. Most
of the literature that has attempted to estimate standard habit specification in a general
equilibrium framework (see Beaudry and Guay (1996), Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher
(1999), or Christiano et al. (2005) among others) report a value for the habit parameter
close to 0.7. We therefore set b = 0.7 in the model with the standard habit specification
(labeled (S) in Table 1). Ravn et al. (2006) report that the estimation of a model featuring
deep habits leads to higher values of the habit parameter (close to 0.9). We therefore set
b = 0.88 in our deep habits version of the model (labeled (D) in the table). Note that
when we impose that the habit parameter is set to 0.88 in both specification (standard
and deep habits) our results are essentially unaffected.
The share of material goods in value added is set to 50% according to the study by
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Table 1: Benchmark calibration
Parameter Mechanism Value
Preferences
β Discount factor 0.9926
σh Inverse of labor supply elasticity 1.0000
µw Markup rate (wages) 0.0500
b Habit parameter 0.70 (S), 0.88 (D)
Technology
sx Share of material goods 0.5000
α Capital elasticity 0.3600
µ Markup rate (goods) 0.4000
σz Elasticity of capital utilization cost 0.0100
Capital Accumulation
δ Depreciation rate 0.0250
ϕk Capital adjustment cost parameter 4.5000
ϕi Investment adjustment cost parameter 2.5000
Nominal rigidities
ξp Price stickiness 0.4000
ξw Wage stickiness 0.3333
Monetary Policy
ρ Interest rate smoothing 0.8000
ωpi Weight on inflation 2.0000
ωy Weight on output 0.0500
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Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987). The fixed cost in the production function, F ,
is set to guarantee that profits are zero in steady state. This assumption is in line with
previous studies by Hall (1988), Basu and Fernald (1994) or Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999) who argue that that economic profits are close to zero. The parameter α is then
set to 0.36 so as to generate a steady state labor share of 64%. There does not exist any
firm consensus on the level of markups in the aggregate economy. Estimates of the level of
markups vary importantly and go from almost zero to more than 100% depending on the
industry we consider. We follow Morrison (1990) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1995)
and set a markup rate of 0.4. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we arbitrarily set the
elasticity of the utilization cost function to 0.01.
The depreciation rate of the economy is set such that capital depreciates at a 10% an-
nual rate implying δ = 0.025. In our benchmark experiment, we mainly consider capital
adjustment costs (ω = 0). The parameter, ϕk, is set such that we roughly match the
investment/capital ratio elasticity of the capital adjustment costs specification reported
in Boldrin et al. (1999). This led us to set ϕk = 4.5. As a robustness check we will also
set ω = 1, therefore considering investment adjustment costs. There does not seem to
exist any consensus on the value of the investment adjustment costs parameter. Smets
and Wouters (2005) report a value close to 6, while Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) use a
value of 1.3. We use the value estimated by Christiano et al. (2005), ϕi = 2.5, which lies
in the middle of the range of available estimates.21
The values used to set the degree of nominal stickiness are rather standard and are bor-
rowed from Christiano et al. (2005). We assume that, should prices be set according to a
Calvo contract scheme, the firms would reset prices once every 2.5 quarters. The degree
of wage stickiness in the wage contract version of the standard New Keynesian model is
set such that wages are set once every 3 quarters on average. We then use the mapping
between the log–linear version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in the Calvo version
and the price adjustment costs version of the model to set the price adjustment costs
parameter.
The monetary policy rule is rather standard. We set the interest rate soothing parameter
to ρ = 0.8 indicating that smoothing is quite substantial in the conduct of monetary
policy. This value is in line with previous estimates reported in the literature (see Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler (1999)). We set a low weight on output, ωy = 0.05. This is in line
with existing estimates of Taylor rules which indicate that monetary authorities place a
21We performed a sensitivity analysis of the results to changes of this value and found no major conse-
quences as long as we do not let it go to either zero or infinity. This will be discussed further in the next
section.
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very low weight on output stability in the rule. The weight on inflation, ωpi = 2.00 is
slightly larger than the commonly used lower value of 1.5. It is however worth noting that
disinflation periods are usually characterized by a more aggressive behavior of the central
bankers with regard to inflation. This value of ωpi takes that feature into account. Our
sensitivity analysis will show the role of this assumption for our results. Finally note that
we have not set the parameter ruling the elasticity of money demand in the model. We
postpone the discussion of this parameter to the next section, as it does not affect our
results in the case of a Taylor rule.
5.2 Accounting for Disinflation Episodes
This section investigates the ability of new Keynesian models to account for the empirical
facts reported in Section 2. We consider three models: (i) the standard new–Keynesian
model with sticky prices and standard catching–up with the Jones, (ii) an extended ver-
sion of the previous model in which we add nominal wage contracts and (iii) our deep
habits version of the new–Keynesian model with sticky prices. We then run the following
experiment. We assume that the monetary authorities announce they will now target a
new inflation rate that is 1 point below the current level and then analyze the resulting
transition dynamics. From a technical point of view, this amounts to analyzing the transi-
tion dynamics between two steady states, the first one having a higher inflation rate than
the second one. This is in line with the way our empirical strategy was conducted as our
dummy variables corresponds to a structural break on average inflation. Figure 9 reports
the results in our benchmark calibration. The figure reports four responses: the data
(plain line) along with the associated confidence interval (shaded area), the deep habit
model, and the two versions of the standard new–Keynesian model.
As can be seen from the figure, the model with deep habits outperforms the other two
versions of the new–Keynesian model. More precisely, it is able to match the dynamics of
inflation and the nominal interest rate, and is the only one to generate a deep recession
for output.
In order to understand the performances of the deep habit model, it is first useful to
characterize the sources of the failure of the standard model. Indeed, both standard
new Keynesian models fail along all dimensions of the data, despite the presence of many
rigidities, either nominal or real. Indeed, as soon as the central banker reduces the targeted
level of inflation, current inflation becomes mechanically too high with regard to the new
target. Inflation targeting triggers an increase in the nominal interest rate. Provided
the Taylor rule is aggressive enough the real interest rate increases. This discourages
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Figure 9: Benchmark Experiment
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consumption and investment and creates a recession. The resulting decline in inputs
demand drives the marginal cost downward. This is illustrated in Figure 10 that reports
the evolution of marginal costs in the models we consider. In the aftermath of this initial
Figure 10: Evolution of the marginal cost
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decline, the relative decrease in prices drives the demand for good upward so that the
phenomenon reverts and the marginal cost steadily goes back to its long–run level. In
other words marginal costs always remain below their steady state level. Now, let us
recall that the new Phillips curve in this class of model takes the form
pit = κmct +
γ
1 + βγ
pit−1 +
β
1 + βγ
pit+1
where κ is a positive constant that depends on other deep parameters (in our setting
ψ, β, γ). It is then clear that the inflation rate is essentially determined by the discounted
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sum of future marginal costs as
pit = γpit−1 + κ
∞∑
τ=0
βτmct+τ
Since the marginal costs converge to their steady state level from below so does the inflation
rate. This failure also obtains in the nominal wage contract economy as the existence of
wage rigidities do not affect the Phillips curve. Consequently, the model cannot reproduce
the response of the nominal interest rate as the initial drop in inflation counters the
mechanical effect we just described. Therefore the nominal interest rate does not shift
upward on impact. Likewise, since inflation decreases, the decline in output is very limited
and the model cannot generate a deep recession.
On the contrary, the deep habit assumption enhances the ability of the model to account for
the observed pattern of the data. As indicated in Figure 9, the model can account for the
initial positive hump in the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate, and can generate a
recession in output.22 As before, the decrease in the target triggers a mechanical decrease
in demand in the model, provided the Taylor rule is aggressive enough with regard to
the inflation gap. As explained by Ravn et al. (2006), this decrease in aggregate demand
triggers a decrease in the price elasticity of the consumption demand of each good j.
Indeed, this demand function is composed of two terms. The first term,
(
Pt(j)
Pt
) 1
θ−1
st, is
price elastic with an elasticity of 1/(1− θ). The second term, bct−1(j), originates from the
habitual consumption of good j and is perfectly price inelastic. The price elasticity of the
consumption demand for good j is a weighted average of the elasticities of these two terms.
The weight on the non zero elasticity is an increasing function of current consumption
growth. Hence, the larger the demand for good j, the larger the price elasticity of the
consumption part of demand. This component is solely due to the existence of deep habits.
The contribution of the price elastic component of the consumption demand for good j
decreases in the aftermath of the decline in the inflation target because it leads agents to
postpone consumption of each good (and therefore aggregate consumption). Therefore,
households are less sensitive to changes in prices. It is then optimal for the firm to limit
profit losses —relative to a situation where the aforementioned mechanism does not play—
the recession generates by increasing its prices (see Figure 11).23 Therefore the deep habit
assumption generates an increase in prices during the recession. In the longer run —as
the recession dampens— the price elastic component of consumption demand regains its
importance, so that price increases no longer help to mitigate profit losses. Therefore,
22We however want to acknowledge that the recession the model generates is neither deep nor persistence
enough with regard to the data. It is however worth noting that, as shown in figure 12, the introduction
of working capital further solves the problem.
23Note that the deep habit model outperforms the other two versions of the new Keynesian model in
terms of profit dynamics.
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Figure 11: Evolution of profits
Quarters
0 5 10 15 20−1.2
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Note: N Deep Habits and sticky prices; • Standard habits
and sticky prices; Standard habits, sticky prices and sticky
wages; Shaded area: 95% confidence interval.
firms have to cut prices to avoid a persistent loss in demand. Hence, inflation drops. It
should be clear that the more persistent the recession, the larger and more persistent the
increase in prices because firms can take advantage of the lower demand elasticity for a
longer period of time. This point will be further discussed in our robustness analysis. As
our specification allows for an initial persistent hump in the inflation rate, the model is
able to generate the observed pattern of the nominal interest rate. Since the increase in
the inflation rate reinforces the mechanical increase in the inflation gap, the central bank
further raises the nominal interest rate which then displays a persistent hump similar to
that observed in the data. It is worth noting that both the response of the inflation rate
and the nominal interest rate lie within the confidence interval of the response obtained in
the data. The model also generates a prolonged and deep recession compared to the earlier
specifications of the model. Again, this recession is related to the evolution of prices. The
increase in prices not only discourages consumption but also investment and utilization
expenditures. Therefore, aggregate demand initially decreases. It shall be noticed that
the response of output lies within the empirical confidence interval until period 12. The
model then fails to account for the observed dynamics after that period. This failure of the
model originates in the fact that the recession is essentially demand driven and created by
the increase in prices. As soon as prices diminish, the recession reverts. It should however
be acknowledged that the model outperforms the other two specification we consider.
One may however be worried that our model does not feature working capital, which
has been shown by Christiano et al. (2005) to be an important transmission channel of
transitory monetary policy shocks. In Figure 12, we report the response of output, inflation
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and the nominal interest rate to a disinflation policy shock in a version of the model
featuring working capital.24 As can be seen from the figure, the working capital assumption
Figure 12: Working Capital
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does not affect the main result. The standard sticky price model fails to account for
the dynamics of aggregates in the aftermaths of the announcement of a disinflation. It
should however be noted that, compared to the previous version, the sticky prices–sticky
wages version of the model performs a little bit better than the nominal interest rate
first responds positively —though by a very small amount. The disinflationary boom
puzzle is gone as the marginal cost includes the interest rate. Indeed, in this case, a
disinflation is accompanied by a high interest rate then marginal cost can be high without
the implication that output is high. When the monetary policy is made very aggressive
(ωpi > 8) the sticky prices–sticky wages version of the model can mimic the response of
the interest rate. Nevertheless inflation never exhibits the hump shaped pattern we found
in the data. Hence, while the working capital assumption magnifies the propagation of
transitory monetary policy shocks, it does not help explaining the effects of disinflation
policy shocks in a standard habit formation framework, while it magnifies the impact of
deep habits. In that latter case, the disinflation recession is deeper and exhibits more
persistence.
24In this case, we use the same specification as in Christiano et al. (2005). The utility function writes
∞∑
τ=0
βτ
[
log(st+τ ) +
νq
1− σq
(
Mct+τ
Pt+τ
)1−σq
− ν
h
1 + σh
h
1+σh
t+τ
]
where Mct denotes cash balances. The budget constraint is given by
BtQt+Mt+
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)(ct(j)+it(j)+vt(j))dj = Bt−1+Rt(Mt−1+Ωt−Mct )+Mct +Ptrk,tutkt+Ptwtht+Πt
Workers must be paid in advance of production such that the firms have to borrow the wage bill from the
the financial intermediary at the gross interest rate Rt. The market clearing condition is then given by
Ptwtht =Mt−Mct . In that case, we follow Christiano et al. (2005) and set σq = 10.65 and Mc/M = 0.44.
The Dynamic Effects of Disinflation Policies 34
5.3 Robustness analysis
As the preceding analysis made clear deep habits are key to match the response of output,
inflation and nominal interest rate during disinflation episodes. It is however important
to stress that this assumption per se is not sufficient for the result. We now review the
role of the different assumptions placed in the model to get the result.
Monetary Policy: The form of monetary policy plays a role in the result. Figure 13
reports the response of output, the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate in the
aftermath of a change in the inflation target. Panel (a) of the figure investigates the case
where the central bank is less aggressive with respect to inflation
log(Rt) = 0.8 log(Rt−1) + (1− 0.8)
[
log(R) + 0.15(log(yt)− log(y)) + 1.5(log(pit)− log(pi)
]
As far as the standard new Keynesian models are concerned, the results remain the same.25
As can be seen from the figure, the deep-habit model no longer produces the hump either
in inflation or in the nominal interest rate, and accordingly fails to generate a recession.
This result stems from the fact that a low degree of aggressiveness with regard to inflation
does not generate a sufficient increase in the inflation rate to generate a deep recession as
witnessed by the weak response of output. Therefore, the initial mechanism that drives
the marginal costs and the price elasticity of demand downward is broken and the model
therefore fails to account for the facts. Panel (b) reports the response of aggregates
when the central bank only fights inflation and does not attempt to track the output gap
(ωy = 0). Overall the performance of the model are not altered by this assumption, which
comes as no surprise as the main concern of the central bank is inflation stabilization —
which is especially relevant in periods of disinflation. It is however worth noting that in this
case the initial response of output is too large, as the initial increase in the nominal interest
rate is not constrained by the willingness of the central bank to limit fluctuations in the
output gap. Panel (c) assesses the role of output gap stabilization in the monetary policy,
by raising ωy to 0.5. As soon as monetary policy puts too much weight on the output gap,
the initial increase in the nominal interest rate —and therefore the real interest rate— is
limited by the willingness of the central bank to smooth the output gap. Therefore, the
model cannot generate any recession and fails to account for the positive hump shaped
dynamics of the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. This result is in line with the
definition of Romer and Romer’s episodes as these are phases during which the monetary
authorities are ready to tolerate output losses to fight inflation.
25This will be the case for all variations we will consider. We will therefore focus our discussion of the
results on the “deep habit case” in the sequel.
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Figure 13: Robustness Analysis: Monetary Policy
(a) Standard Taylor rule (ρ = 0.8, ωpi = 1.5, ωy = 0.15)
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(b) Pure inflation targeting (ρ = 0.8, ωpi = 2, ωy = 0)
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(c) High weight on output gap (ρ = 0.8, ωpi = 2, ωy = 0.5)
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In order to assess the robustness of our results to alternative representation of disinflation
policy, Figure 14 reports the response of aggregates in the case where the central bank does
not rely on an interest rate rule to create the disinflation episode but instead cuts money
supply growth permanently. The money growth process is calibrated so as to roughly
match the dynamics of money supply growth reported in Figure 2. This led us to assume
that the money supply drops initially and then converges steadily to this new value with
persistence equal to 0.6. The size of the initial drop is set so as to match the trough in the
response of money growth in Figure 2. We have to set one additional parameter, σm, in
the model without working capital. Our strategy is as follows. We set this parameter such
that all models match the initial response of the nominal interest rate. This led us to set
σm = 8. Panel (a) of the figure shows that the deep habits version of the model outperforms
the other two versions. The cut in the money supply growth creates the recession which
initiates the internal mechanism driving inflation upward in the deep habit version of the
model. Note however that, given that we leave the monetary policy totally exogenous in
this case, the hump in inflation dynamics is short lasting compared to the interest rate
rule. The response of the nominal interest rate is also pretty well reproduced in the model
as the positive response of the inflation rate reinforces the impact of the decline in money
growth. As soon as standard habits are brought back into the model, inflation and the
nominal interest rate are badly reproduced. In particular, inflation falls persistently in
the aftermath of the shock. In order to further investigate this issue, we report in panel
(b) the responses in the working capital version of the model. The model with nominal
wage contracts with working capital performs better than its previous version as it is able
to generate the positive hump on the interest rate. It however fails to mimic the response
of inflation. The deep habits version does not perform as well as before in that inflation
does not rise on impact and neither does the nominal interest rate, but the model gets the
overall shape right.
Although, as aforementioned, Taylor rules can be thought of as good representation of
monetary policy, we now investigate the robustness of the results to the use of a money
growth rule instead, which may be thought of as a better representation of what happened
during the pre–Volcker period. We consider a rule of the form
log(γt) = % log(γt−1) + (1− %)(log(γ) +$y(log(yt)− log(y)) +$pi(log(pit)− log(pi))
where γt is the gross rate of growth of money supply. %, $pi and $y are then set such
that the model accounts for the dynamics of the inflation rate. We set % = 0.5, $pi = −2
and $y = −0.5. Figure 15 reports the the implied dynamics. As can be seen from Panel
(a), and for the same reasons as before, the deep habit model accounts for the dynamics
of the three main variables under consideration, while the standard habit specification
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Figure 14: Robustness Analysis: Cutting Money Growth
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cannot match the facts. This occurs as long as the central bank is primarily concerned
by inflation ($pi = −2). This result is therefore in line with our benchmark specification.
In other words, the goal of monetary policy matters more than its actual implementation
in the model. It is however worth noting that, contrary to the Taylor rule, the use of a
money supply rule requires some output gap targeting ($y = −0.5). Its main role in the
model is to prevent the nominal interest rate to respond too much. Also note that the
overall performance of the standard habit model does not improve under a money growth
rule neither in the model without nor in the model with the working capital assumption
(see Panel(b) of Figure 15).
This analysis clearly illustrates that disinflation periods are time in which inflation is
the main —not to say the sole— concern of the central bank, which then becomes more
aggressive with regard to inflation gaps. The way this disinflation policy is implemented
does not seem to be critical, therefore indicating that most of our results are due to the
countercyclicality of markups.
Real Frictions In this paragraph we want to stress the role of real frictions. The reason
is clear. The persistence of the recession hinges on these mechanisms. Provided the latter
are taken into account, the recession lasts for a sufficient number of period that firms can
take advantage of a lower price elasticity to raise their prices in the short–run. In Panel (a)
of Figure 16 we set a lower deep habit parameter (b = 0.5). In this case, the persistence
of habits is not sufficient to let firms use price increases to limit profit losses. Indeed, the
decrease in the price elasticity is not large and persistent enough and any increase in prices
translates very soon into a decline in the demand for consumption goods. The model then
fails to mimic the facts and starts resembling the standard habit specification.
Panel (b) and (c) of Figure 16 illustrate the role of real frictions in the model. In Panel
(b) we replace capital adjustment costs by investment adjustment costs. In this case,
the model still generates a recession, but that recession is less pronounced than with
capital adjustment costs, and the model has difficulties generating hump shapes in inflation
and the interest rate.26 The reason of this failure is clear. Investment adjustment costs
essentially spread the changes in the level of investment over time, as this is changes in
the level of investment that are penalized. This precludes investment from dropping and
therefore limits the magnitude of the recession. The household devotes more of their
income to consumption and can therefore improve their consumption smoothing, which
limits the decline in the price elasticity. Overall, this limits the ability of firms to increase
26The model can still generate a positive hump shape in inflation and the interest rate provided the
central bank is assumed to be more aggressive with regard to inflation.
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Figure 15: Robustness Analysis: Money Growth Rule
(a) Benchmark model
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prices as a way to limit profit losses and therefore significantly dampens the hump in
inflation and the interest rate. One way to circumvent this difficulty and keep investment
adjustment costs is to drive ϕi to much higher values (ϕi = 20). But in this latter case,
investment does not react anymore and the model reduces to a model in which demand
is essentially determined by consumption. The price elasticity mechanisms fully plays. In
Panel (c) we shut down utilization. Once again the model cannot account for the facts.
Indeed utilization acts as a way to magnify persistence in the model, and in particular the
persistence of the recession. Once we shut down this channel, the recession does not last
and is very weak. Therefore, the model lacks the two initial ingredients that are at the
source of the decline in the price elasticity: (i) the deep recession and (ii) its persistence.
The failure of the model then comes as no surprise.
Panel (d) of the model investigates a situation in which we get rid off the material goods
in the production function. The model then fails to account for the facts. Indeed, material
goods act as a way to smooth the real marginal cost in the economy as in this case it can
be expressed as a linear combination of a time varying component, stemming from the
Cobb–Douglas technology, and a constant component, pertaining to the material goods.27
This therefore limits the drop in the marginal cost and therefore enables prices to respond
positively through the price elasticity channel. When the share of material goods is driven
to zero, the marginal cost channel takes the upper hand and inflation responds negatively
on impact. One way to recover a positive hump–shaped response of inflation is therefore to
magnify the price elasticity channel by increasing the level of markups in steady states. For
instance, raising markups to 65% the model generates responses similar to what obtains
in our benchmark specification.
This sensitivity analysis illustrates the role of real frictions in accounting for disinflation
episodes. Therefore, while we analyze totally different types of monetary policy shocks,
we come to similar conclusions to those reached by Christiano et al. (2005) who argued
that any model that aims at accounting for monetary facts has to possess strong enough
real propagation mechanisms capable of protracting the effects of monetary policy.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigated the effects of disinflation policies on the macroeconomic variables
that are the core of the monetary transmission mechanism. Using postwar US data and
episode techniques, we identify disinflation shocks as shocks that drive the inflation rate
27Technically, we have mct = sx + (1− sx) r
α
k,tw
1−α
t
αα(1−α)1−α .
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Figure 16: Robustness analysis (Real Frictions)
(a) Low habits (b = 0.5)
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(b) Investment adjustment costs (ω = 1, ϕi = 2.5)
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(c) Utilization (σz →∞)
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to a lower level in the long–run. We find that in the immediate aftermath of a disinflation
policy, the economy enters a persistent recession. The inflation rate increases above its
long–run level and exhibits a positive hump–shaped response for about 10 quarters. A
similar pattern is found for the nominal interest rate, which responds even more strongly in
the short–run. We then assess whether the standard new Keynesian model, as exemplified
in Christiano et al. (2005), Altig et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2005) can account
for these facts.
We find that, in a reasonably calibrated version of the model, the standard new Keynesian
model fails to mimic the dynamics of both inflation and the nominal interest rate. The
reason is that the model generates insufficiently countercyclical markups. We then modify
the model along the lines recently advocated by Ravn et al. (2006) and introduce a deep
habits phenomenon. The model is then able to match the joint dynamics of inflation and
the nominal interest rate, and outperforms a sticky price and a sticky price–sticky wage
version of the standard new Keynesian model in terms of output, inflation and interest rate
dynamics. The reason of this success is that the deep habit model generates countercyclical
markups that drive inflation and the interest rate upward during the recession. Another
finding of the model is that, as already argued in Christiano et al. (2005), additional real
frictions are needed to get the dynamics of macroeconomic variables right. For instance,
shutting down adjustment costs and/or variable utilization leads to a worsening of the
results.
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Figure 17: Historical decomposition of episodes 1–4
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Figure 18: Response to disinflation shock (Blanchard and Quah identification)
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